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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Priority No. 2 
v. : 
GILBERT LOPEZ, : Case No. 980085-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal which was poured over from the Utah 
Supreme Court (R. 217), under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Has defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel 
rendered constitutionally adequate assistance or to show to a demonstrable reality 
that trial counsel's representation undermines confidence in the guilty verdict? 
This claim presents a question of law reviewed on the trial record because 
defendant raises it for the first time on direct appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing. 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const Amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (199^ (R. 1). 
A three dayjury trial was held 14-16 October 1998 (R. 133-134, 137-138). 
Following the presentation of all the evidence, and prior to jury deliberations, trial 
counsel moved to dismiss the case on grounds that the eyewitness identification testimony 
of the three victims was so inconsistent as to render evidence of defendant's guilt 
insufficient (R. 246: 186) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in 
addendum F).1 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that any 
inconsistencies in the identification evidence went to the credibility of the witnesses and 
that the State had presented sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury (id). The jury 
*Only the first page of the various volumes of transcript is numbered in the record 
on appeal and subsequent pages retain their original numbering. Therefore, transcript 
pages will be cited in this brief as "(R. [record number]: [internal page number])." 
2 
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thereafter convicted defendant as charged (R. 139; R. 231: 14-15). 
The trial court imposed the statutory prison term of five years-to-life, which 
sentence was to be served consecutively to any other sentence defendant was then serving 
(R. 191). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 192). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Rick Bergsma had just purchased three cases of beer and was walking home with 
his wife and brother-in-law when defendant and a cohort pointed a gun at him and also 
pressed a gun to his wife's back, demanding the beer or they would shoot. 
Aggravated Robbery 
At approximately 12:45 p.m., on 21 July 1996, Rick and Brandi Bergsma and 
Donny Drake were walking west on 2700 South near 700 East, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Rick had just purchased approximately $56 dollars worth of Budweiser beer at the Circle-
K convenience store located at the intersection (R. 230: 97, 99-100; R. 246: 123).2 
Suddenly, Donny noticed a suspicious car following them and instructed Rick and Brandi 
to cut through the golf course that runs along the south side of 2700 South exclaiming, 
"We're about to get robbed or something" (R. 230: 103, 208-209, 224). The suspicious 
car parked at the Texaco gas station, located across the street and kitty-comer from the 
Circle-K, with its headlights trained on the Bergsmas and Donny (R. 230: 155, 210, 225; 
2While the victims had just purchased beer, they had not been drinking (R. 230: 98, 
222; R. 246: 49). 
3 
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I 
R. 246: 15). Two men got out of the car and headed toward the victims (id). As the two 
men ran toward them, Rick, Brandi and Donny started into the golf course (R. 230: 104, 
156). Donny "knew" instantly what would follow: "I have seen it happen before. They 
were creeping slow when I noticed they were looking at us" (R. 230: 208). 
The robbers caught up with the Bergsmas and Donny and the first robber, 
identified at trial as defendant, pointed his gun at Donny and then at Rick, stating "Yo, 
Homes, drop your beer or I'll kill you" (R. 230: 104, 146, 210). Seeing the gun, Rick put 
the beer down and stepped back one-half step (R. 230: 106). Defendant came within 
three to four feet of the victims, until "he was right in front of [Rick]" (R. 230: 106, 211; 
R. 246: 22). He then stuffed his gun down his pants and picked up the beer before 
running back to his car (R. 230: 108, 157). The second robber, who was holding a gun to 
Brandi's back, said, "Now, run, bitch," before joining defendant (R. 230: 109; R. 51). 
While Rick and Brandi ran into the golf course, Donny "snuck (sic) around a bush and got 
the license plate and make of the car" (R. 230: 214). After the car drove off, the victims 
called police from the Texaco station (R. 230: 108; R. 246: 78). 
Eyewitness Descriptions of Robbers 
While the robbery occurred at night, all three victims agreed that the area was 
sufficiently well-light for them to see the robbers and they provided descriptions of the 
robbers to police five to ten minutes after the robbery (R. 230: 109, 153-155, 187, 226-
227; R. 246: 10-13, 110). Officer Michael Johnson, of the Salt Lake City Police 
4 
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Department, investigated the robbery and agreed that when the Texaco is open, as it was 
at the time of the robbery, lighting conditions at the intersection are "very good" (R. 246: 
80; R. 230: 101). The victims talked with investigating police for 15-20 minutes at the 
Texaco station immediately following the robbery, spending approximately two minutes 
filling out written witness report forms (R. 230: 129,213) (copies of the all three witness 
report forms are contained in addendum A). 
Rick Bergsma. Shaken and scared, Rick was nonetheless able to describe the first 
robber (defendant) that held a gun to him as a "Spick" or Hispanic, approximately 22 
years old, 5'5" tall and 165 pounds (R. 230: 111-112, 145-146, 164-165) (Exh. # 33), add. 
A. Rick estimated that the robbery lasted 30 seconds and that he looked at the gun for 5-
10 seconds and at defendant for 10-15 seconds (R. 230: 145). He particularly focused on 
defendant's face, whom he described as having short straight brown hair, and no facial 
hair (Exh. # 33), add. A. However, he also described defendant's clothing as a light shirt 
and dark pants (R. 230: 106-07, 184). Rick described the second robber as a male 
Hispanic, having a shaved head and a similar short and stocky build, approximately 5'6" 
tall and 160-170 pounds (R. 230: 108) (Exh. # 33), add. A. 
Brandi Bergsma. Although she was similarly "scared out of her wits," Brandi, 
who is half Hispanic (R. 230: 196), also described the robbers as Hispanic and noted that 
the first robber (defendant), the robber that held a gun to her husband, was "short," or 
approximately 5f 1" to 5'5" tall, 145 pounds, with short black hair, no facial hair, and was 
5 
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wearing a white shirt and blue or dark colored pants (R. 246: 26,43,46) (Exh. #31), add. 
A. Brandi described the second robber, or the robber that held a gun to her back as 
having short fuzzy hair, "almost a buzz" (R. 246: 29). 
Donny Drake. Finally, Donny also described the robbers as Hispanic or Mexican 
(Exh. # 32), add. A. He described defendant as wearing dark shorts, a white t-shirt, and 
as having short hair (R. 230: 211-212). Donny also similarly described the second robber 
as approximately 18 years old, 57" tall, 150 pounds, and "kind of bald" (R. 230: 214-
215). Donny did not mention whether he observed facial hair on either robber (Exh. # 
32), add. A. 
Eyewitness Descriptions of Robbers'Monte Carlo 
The victims also described the robbers' car: A brown or dark colored Cadillac or 
Monte Carlo (R. 230: 112-113,208, 214-215; R. 246: 14) (Exh. ## 7-9). Rick thought 
that the car had a light colored top (R. 230: 155, 182), and could not tell how many 
people were in the car (R. 230: 183). Donny thought he saw four individuals, including 
the two robbers, inside the car (R. 230: 208). Brandi thought she saw a female in the car 
(R. 246: 25). 
Robbers'Monte Carlo Located One Half Block from the Robbery 
Approximately one half hour after the robbery, Officer Johnson headed back to the 
police department traveling north on 700 East (R. 246: 81,124). At approximately 2400 
South 700 East, the officer saw a Monte Carlo traveling south on 700 East which fit the 
6 
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victims' descriptions of the robbers' car down to the license plate {id.)? The Monte Carlo 
pulled into a four-plex located at 2536 South 700 East, approximately one half block from 
the crime scene (R. 246: 81, 99).4 
Showup Identification of Defendant and Alleged Cohort 
Officer Johnson approached to talk to a man exiting the Monte Carlo and 
simultaneously noticed that a fight was breaking out in one of the apartments (R. 246: 82-
83, 116). Officer Johnson quickly made his way to the apartment as four men, including 
defendant, ran down the stairs (R. 246: 83). He drew his weapon and ordered them to 
stop, but one of the four men fled on foot (id). The three men were detained and 
handcuffed (R. 246: 83-84). In addition to these individuals, the officer found two 
females and another male inside the apartment (R. 246: 98). Officer Johnson observed 
that three of the detained men matched the victims' descriptions of the robbers (R. 246: 
85). The officer therefore had the victims brought to the apartment for a showup which 
included these three men as well as the man who exited the Monte Carlo (R. 246: 86, 
125). 
Because lighting conditions were otherwise poor, Officer Johnson had several 
3Donny had reported that the robbers' license plate number was OL6 JLZ (id.). 
The Monte Carlo Officer Johnson saw bore the plate number 016 JLZ (R. 246: 82). 
4The Monte Carlo was registered to Linda Trujillo, but her husband Steve drove 
the car (R. 230: 202-203). Defendant and Steve Trujillo were friends at the time of the 
robbery (R. 230: 204). 
7 
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officers train their flashlights on the detained group, as well as patrol car headlights and 
spotlights (R. 246: 87). When Officer Johnson approached the patrol vehicle in which the 
victims had arrived, all three started talking at once and identified defendant and an 
individual named Gary Gomez as the robbers (R. 246: 89; see R. 230: 131-134, 137-138; 
218-220; R. 246: 32-37, 53). Rick and Donny both noticed that while defendant had 
worn a white or light colored t-shirt at the time of the robbery, he had a black t-shirt on , 
over a white t-shirt at the time of the showup (R. 230: 134,219) (Exh. ##10-11) (copies 
of the exhibits are contained in addendum B). All three witnesses also identified the 
Monte Carlo at the four-plex as the robber's car (R. 230: 133, 22C-221; R. 246: 55) (Exh. 
##7-9). 
According to Officer Johnson, while the victims identified defendant as one of the 
robbers, it was not until trial that they identified defendant as the robber that held a gun to 
Rick and Donny (R. 246: 100-101). The victims also initially identified Gomez as the < 
robber which held the gun to Brandi's back {id.). Officer Johnson observed that 
defendant and Gomez were both short and stocky, and were approximately 5?5" tall, and 
< 
150-160 pounds (R. 246: 90).5 
5At trial, Rick testified that defendant and Gomez were handcuffed when he 
identified them at the showup (R. 246: 125-126). Donny did not mention whether any of ( 
the suspects were handcuffed (R. 230: 218-220), and Brandi could not recall how many of 
the suspects were handcuffed (R. 246: 52). Pictures of the suspects at the four-plex show 
that Gomez at least, and possibly defendant, were handcuffed (R. 246: 102) (Exh. ## 24, 
26) (copies of the exhibits are contained in addendum D). Officer Johnson thought it was
 { 
possible that the pictures of the suspects at the four-plex were taken after the showup 
8 
i 
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Defendant Admits Being at the Scene of the Robbery 
Both defendant and Gomez denied knowledge of the robbery and no weapons were 
found on them (R. 246: 117-119). Defendant admitted, however, that he had been at the 
Circle-K convenience store that evening, but claimed that he had only purchased beer (R. 
246: 136-137). Police searched the apartment and found three cases of Budweiser beer 
and saw beer cans spread throughout the apartment, but they found no beer receipts inside 
the apartment or inside the robbers' Monte Carlo (R. 246: 94, 99). 
Victims Identify Defendant and Alleged Cohort in Photo Spread 
Officer Cheever of the Salt Lake City Police Department spoke with the victims 
after the robbery to clarify their identifications of the robbers (R. 246: 139-141). He 
showed all three victims separately and individually, a photo spread which included 
pictures of defendant and Gomez and five other individuals with similar characteristics 
(R. 246: 142) (Exh. ## 12-13, 15-20) (copies of the photos included in the photo spread 
are contained in addendum E).6 Officer Cheever instructed the victims not to feel like 
they had to identify any of the suspects, that the suspects in the aggravated robbery may 
or may not be included in the photo spread, and that the suspects may not look exactly the 
same as they did when the robbery occurred because they may have made changes to 
identification and not before (R. 246: 125). 
6Detective Cheevers folded back booking information appearing on the photos, 
prior to showing them to the witnesses (R. 246: 143). 
9 
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their physical appearance (R. 246: 143). All three witnesses immediately picked out 
photos of defendant and Gomez and identified them as the robbers (R. 246: 144-146) 
(Exh. ## 12-13), add. E. At this time, all three witnesses similarly agreed that defendant 
was the robber that held a gun to Brandi's back, while Gomez was the robber that held a 
gun on Donny and Rick (R. 246: 146-147). 
Defendant Leaves Drinking Party to Get More Beer 
Crystal Guiterrez is defendant's cousin and attended the drinking party held at the 
four-plex on the night of the robbery7 (R. 246: 63-66). According to Crystal, defendant 
and his friend Steve Trujillo w^re a. so at the party and talked about getting some more 
beer (R. 246: 71). Defendant and Trujillo then left the party with two girls and returned 
with beer (R. 246: 72). Crystal was unsure whether defendant was at the party between 
12:30 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. (R. 246: 74). She was also unsure how many cases of beer 
defendant brought with him when he returned to the party (R. 246: 75). 
Defense witness Justin Ketterer is another cousin of defendant's that also attended 
the drinking party the night of the robbery (R. 246: 164-165). Justin claimed that he 
arrived with his brother, defendant and two girls at approximately 10:30 p.m. (R. 246: 
165). He acknowledged that defendant left the party for approximately one half hour 
with two girls and two guys (R. 246: 166, 173). However, Justin claimed that defendant 
7Crystal testified as a hostile witness for the prosecution (R. 246: 65). 
10 
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returned to the party at approximately 11:45 p.m. without the two girls (R. 246: 167). 
According to Justin, a fight broke out around 12:45 p.m. and that is when he and his 
brother left (R. 246: 168). Justin saw approximately 3-4 cases of beer before leaving the 
party (R. 246: 169-170). On cross-examination, Justin admitted that he did not have any 
special reason to remember the times of defendant's coming and going from the party (R. 
246: 175). He also did not know what defendant did while he was absent from the party 
(R. 246: 178). 
Defendant's Alleged Cohort Establishes an Alibi 
Crystal also testified that while Gomez attended the party, he did not bring any 
beer with him (R. 246: 71). Charges against Gomez were ultimately dismissed because 
he was able to substantiate his alibi at the time of the robbery through four different 
witnesses (R. 246: 161). 
Victims Identify Defendant as One of the Robbers 
At trial, all three victims identified defendant as the robber that held a gun on 
Donny and Rick (R. 230: 104-107, 134, 145-146, 191-192, 211, 240-241; R. 246: 22, 26). 
Rick initially believed that defendant held the gun in his right hand, but at trial he 
testified defendant held the gun in his left hand (R. 230: 178). Brandi also thought that 
defendant held the gun in his right hand, but was unsure when she testified at trial (R. 
246: 48). Donny consistently reported that defendant held the gun in his left hand (R. 
230: 211, 241). Defendant is left-handed (R. 247: 16). 
11 
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Additionally, Rick and Brandi initially reported that defendant had no facial hair 
(Exh. #31, 33), add. A. At trial, however, Rick acknowledged that in looking at pictures 
of defendant taken at the time of his arrest, defendant's light facial hair was visible to him 
in the courtroom from a distance of five feet (R. 230: 167-168), and Brandi remembered 
for the first time that defendant had facial hair on his chin at the time of the robbery (R. 
246: 29, 59). See also (Exh. ## 10-12) (pictures of defendant taken the night of his arrest) 
(copies are contained in addendum B). Donny did not mention whether he observed 
facial hair on either of the robbers (Exh. # 32), add. A. 
Despite these minor discrepancies, all three victims were ultimately certain that 
defendant was one of the robbers and that he had a gun (R. 230: 194, 241; R. 246: 41). 
i 
They also agreed that defendant's appearance had changed since the robbery: He 
appeared to weigh less and to have longer hair (R. 230: 107, 192, 212; R. 246: 59). 
Officer Johnson similarly noted the change in defendant's appearance between the time of \ 
the aggravated robbery and the time of trial (R. 246: 93). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
i 
Defendant fails to show that trial counsel's decision against attempting to suppress 
pre-trial the three eyewitness identifications was other than a consciously chosen, 
< 
reasonable tactic, given the limited chance of success and the overall strength of the 
evidence. Moreover, the tactic permitted defendant to challenge the strong, consistent 
identification of the State's strongest witness, whose identification could not be ( 
12 
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suppressed under State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), by preserving for 
impeachment the State's weaker witnesses. Given the strength of the witnesses 
identifications, however, coupled with additional compelling evidence linking defendant 
to the aggravated robbery, a pre-trial motion to suppress, even if granted with respect to 
the weaker of the witnesses, would not have resulted in a more favorable trial outcome. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO OVERCOME THE STRONG 
PRESUMPTION THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED 
CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OR TO SHOW 
TO A DEMONSTRABLE REALITY THAT TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
PERFORMANCE UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE IN THE JURY'S 
GUILTY VERDICT 
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in not moving pre-trial to 
suppress the eyewitness identifications under State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
However, defendant fails to show that a pre-trial motion to suppress the identifications 
would likely have resulted in a more favorable trial outcome, given the motion's limited 
chance of success and the overall strength of the trial evidence. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show 
that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that there exists a 
reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, he would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 
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(Utah App. 1992) (same). To demonstrate objectively deficient performance, defendant 
must overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance. 
Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah 
App. 1994) (same). In addition, this Court will give trial counsel wide latitude in making 
tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis 
supporting them. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 (citing Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282); State v. 
Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (same). 
A. Defendant Fails to Demonstrate the Likely Success of a Pre-trial 
Motion to Suppress the Eyewitness Identifications and Therefore He 
Fails to Demonstrate That Trial Counsel Performed Deficiently 
Defendant asserts that in light of Ramirez, the eyewitness identifications in this 
case were fatally flawed and that reasonable trial counsel, therefore, would have moved to 
suppress them pre-trial. Aplt. Br. at 13-14. However, in evaluating the evidence under 
the Ramirez factors and comparing it with the facts of Ramirez defendant has variously 
omitted facts describing conditions and circumstances of observation superior to those in 
Ramirez, gratuitously presumed the witnesses' compromised mental states throughout the 
aggravated robbery, and overstated the suggestiveness of the showup in comparison with 
that in Ramirez. In fact, the three eyewitness identifications in this case, are superior to 
the sole eyewitness identification in Ramirez. Therefore, a pre-trial motion to suppress 
would likely have failed and trial counsel reasonably elected not to exert time on a futile 
motion. State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37,44 (Utah 1996). 
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1. The Eyewitness Identification in Ramirez was Based on Limited Capacity 
and Opportunity to Observe, Made in Worse Conditions, Inconsistent 
Over Time, and Uncorroborated by Any Other Witness 
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court extended its recognition that eyewitness 
testimony is both potent yet fallible, see State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483,488-91 (Utah 1986), 
thereby requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was central to 
the case, to undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability/1 
preliminary to admitting such testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. Noting that M[t]he ultimate question to be 
determined is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was 
reliable," the supreme court listed the following pertinent factors by which reliability 
must be determined: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) 
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an 
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed 
and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).8 
8In Ramirez, two armed, masked men robbed a Pizza Hut. Id. at 776. Shortly 
before 1:00 a.m. Kathy Davis, the manager of the Pizza Hut, was preparing to leave the 
restaurant with her husband, John Davis, and her brother, Gerald Wilson. Id. Upon 
leaving, they were accosted by a man (the "pipe man") wearing a scarf across his face 
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Applying the above-referenced factors to the eyewitness identification in Ramirez, 
the supreme court found that, although an "extremely close case," the trial court had 
properly denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-
84.9 
who demanded the day's receipts. Id. A scuffle followed and the pipe man hit Wilson 
with the pipe and told a previously undetected robber (the "gunman") to kill Wilson if he
 ( 
moved again. Id. The gunman, Ramirez, also wore a scarf covering most of his face, and 
was crouched near the corner of the building, holding a gun. Id. When the Davises 
returned with the bank bag, the robbers fled. Id. 
Ramirez was stopped a short time after the robbery and a few blocks from the 
Pizza Hut, when he was found to match the description of one of the robbery suspects. < 
Id. at 776-777. Police brought the Davises and Wilson to the scene of Pamirez's 
detention, apparently informing them that "the officers had found someone who matched 
the description of one of the robbers." Id. at 777. When the witnesses arrived at the 
showup, Ramirez, a dark-complexioned Apache Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link 
fence. Id. He was the only suspect, and the spotlights and headlights of patrol cars were 
turned on him. Id. The witnesses viewed him from a patrol car. Id. Only Wilson was 
able to identify Ramirez as the gunman; the other two witnesses were unable to identify 
him as one of the robbers. Id. 
9Regarding the first factor, the witness's opportunity to view the actor during the 
event, the supreme court noted Wilson varied in his statements about how long he viewed 
the gunman, from a "a few seconds" or "a second," to "a minute" or longer. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 782. The evidence indicated that the gunman was crouched by the end of the 
building, that Wilson viewed him from between ten to thirty feet, that at one point his 
view was obstructed, that the lighting was variously described from good to poor and the 
gunman was in a shadowy area, and that Wilson could only determine that the gunman's 
eyes were small. Id. at 782-83. 
As to the second factor, the witness's attention to the actor, Wilson was fully 
aware that a robbery was taking place and claimed to have focused on the gunman to the 
exclusion of the pipe man, even though he was still threatened by the pipe man when he 
saw the gunman and gave a much more detailed description of the pipe man than of the 
gunman at the time of the robbery. Id. at 783. 
Regarding the third factor, the witness's capacity to observe the actor during the 
event, the supreme court found that it was reasonable to assume that Wilson experienced 
16 
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2. The Three Eyewitness Identifications in This Case Were All Superior to 
the Sole Identification of the Eyewitness in Ramirez 
Contrary to defendant's claims, see Aplt. Br. at 13-14, the three eyewitness 
identifications in this case are superior to the sole identification in Ramirez, and would 
"a heightened degree of stress," since, in struggling with his assailant, the witness was hit 
once in the stomach with the pipe and almost hit a second time. Wilson described his 
eyesight as good with his glasses, and f,[a]side from the late hour and the injury from the 
pipe blow," there was no record evidence of any other physical impairments. Id. 
The fourth reliability factor concerns whether the identification was spontaneous 
and remained consistent or whether it was the product of suggestion. Id. In Ramirez, the 
supreme court found that thirty minutes to an hour between the robbery and the 
identification as no indication that Wilson's mental capacity affected his identification. 
Id. at 783. Although he was aware that one of the other witnesses had not identified 
Ramirez, he was not otherwise exposed to other identifications or opinions, and neither of 
the other two witnesses identified Ramirez as the gunman. Id. However, the witness's 
physical descriptions of the gunman were "confused." Id. Wilson gave a very detailed 
description of the pipe man, but merely described the gunman as "a male Mexican, five 
feet nine inches to six feet tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levi's, with a white scarf 
around the lower part of his face." Id. John Davis, on the other hand, described Ramirez 
as five foot six inches tall and wearing a red and white cap. Id. at 784. Although 
Ramirez had readily visible tatoos on his arms, Wilson did not mention them at the time 
of the robbery or at the preliminary hearing, stating for the first time at trial that he had 
seen them on the gunman. Id. At the time of arrest, Ramirez was wearing Levi's and a 
blue sweatshirt with paint spattered on the front, but which may have been worn inside 
out and a brown baseball cap. Id. At the suppression hearing, Wilson positively stated 
that the gunman wore no hat, although at trial he was not sure. Id. 
Most "troublesome" for the supreme court was the "blatant suggestiveness"of the 
showup, which, involved the lone suspect, handcuffed to a fence, the target of headlights, 
surrounded by police who had indicated to witnesses that they had located someone who 
fit one of the robber's description. Id. The suggestiveness of the showup was 
compounded because none of the witnesses ever saw the gunman without the mask, and 
the sole identifying witness made his identification based only on the gunman's eyes, a 
view of which this Court assumed must have been compromised by the gunman's 
wearing a hat. Id. The supreme court somewhat discounted the racial distinction because 
the identification was based only on the gunman's eyes, physical size and clothing. Id. 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have been admissible in spite of the fact that the trial court did not have an opportunity to 
review the evidence pursuant to a pre-trial Ramirez motion. 
a. Witness's Opportunity to View Defendant. The first Ramirez factor takes 
into account an eyewitness's opportunity to view the suspects. Id. at 782. The Ramirez 
robber was masked, crouched down, and viewed from ten to thirty feet away. Id. As set 
out in detail in the Statement of the Facts, supra, all three witness's opportunity to 
observe defendant exceeded that of the lone eyewitness in Ramirez, who saw only a 
portion of Ramirez's masked face. Id. at 784. 
The instant robor j lastea 30 seconds and occurred after dark; however, the 
intersection was sufficiently lit from street and business lights for the witnesses to see 
defendant's unmasked face (R. 230: 153-155, 226-227; R. 246: 10-13, 80). Indeed, 
nothing in the record indicates the witnesses were unable to see defendant's face during 
the robbery: He came within three to four feet of the victims until he was right in front of 
Rick (R. 230: 106, 211; R. 246: 22). Rick estimated that he looked at defendant's gun for 
five to ten seconds, and that he looked at defendant for 10-15 seconds (R. 230: 145). See 
State v. Willetu 909 P.2d 218, 220, 224 (Utah 1995) (finding eyewitness's Mfew seconds" 
observation of defendant "sufficiently reliable" to be admitted). Moreover, unlike the 
eyewitness in Ramirez who identified Ramirez by his eyes, the three eyewitnesses in this 
case provided information regarding defendant's clothing, race, hair color and style, and 
they were also able to get some idea of his age, height, and weight (R. 246: 110). Their 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
descriptions were close to the official description made when defendant was booked later 
that night (Exh. # 12), add. A.10 
Defendant places emphasis on the fact that the witnesses described the robber as 
wearing a light shirt and dark pants, yet he was apprehended wearing a dark shirt over a 
light shirt, a religious pendant around his neck, and khaki colored pants. Aplt. Br. at 19. , 
Because nearly one half hour away passed from the time of the robbery until defendant 
was apprehended, it is possible that he changed his clothing in that time (R. 246: 124). In 
any event, any discrepancies between the witnesses individual descriptions of defendant's 
appearance and/or between defendant's appearance at the time of his arrest, do not render 
the identifications inadmissible, but do bear on the individual eyewitness's credibility and 
weight the jurors may give the identification testimony. State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 
658 (Utah App. 1992), cert denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 
1232, 1234-35 (Utah App. 1995) (upholding eyewitness identification describing Perry as 
clean shaven, 5f6M to 57" tall and weighing approximately 150 pounds, when at the time 
of his arrest a short while later, Perry was 5f9" tall, 170 pounds and had a slight 
10Defendant's booking photo indicates that he is a male Hispanic, born 16 March 
1972, 5*4" tall, 180 pounds, with short straight dark hair, and thin or light facial hair (Exh. 
#12), add. A. As for the any slight discrepancies between the eyewitnesses descriptions 
and information listed on defendant's booking photo, Detective Cheever cautioned that 
the "jailers" do not weigh the individual being booked, but rather ask the arrested person 
what they weigh (R. 246: 148-149). He also pointed out that if a suspect has been 
previously booked into jail at a certain weight and then loses weight and is booked into 
jail on a later occasion, the jailers typically go by the suspect's criminal history and do 
not update the information (id.). 
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mustache). 
b. Witness's Degree of Attention and Capacity to Observe Defendant. The 
witnesses' degree of attention to, and capacity to observe defendant were also superior to 
that of the one eyewitness in Ramirez for purposes of the second and third Ramirez 
factors. Donny's attention was drawn to the occupants of the Monte Carlo even before 
the robbery, when he first noticed their suspicious behavior (R. 230: 208-209, 224). All 
three witness's attention was drawn to the robbers by at least the time the robbers 
instructed Rick to hand over the beer or be shot (R. 230: 104, 145-146, 180). Rick, in 
particular, concentrated on remembering defendant's face as defendant held a gun on him 
(R. 230: 184). Although the witnesses were frightened and agitated, nothing in the record 
suggests their natural anxiety at being robbed hindered their ability to see defendant 
clearly. Nor were there other distracting noises or activity in the intersection at the time 
of the robbery. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. Identification of the Ramirez robber, on the 
other hand, was hindered by the fact that his accomplice was physically assaulting the 
eyewitness in that case with a pipe. 817 P.2d 783. Finally, the record is also devoid of 
indication that the witnesses acted under any personal motivation, bias, or prejudice, or 
that their vision was poor, or that they were impaired by fatigue, injury, drugs or alcohol. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2dat 783. 
Defendant points to Rick's use of the ethnic slur MSpick"on his witness report form 
(Exh. # 33), add. A, and claims that it indicates' Rick's bias. Aplt. Br. at 16. Rick 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
explained his use of the slur was based on his anger at being robbed, and cramped space 
on the form (R. 230: 164-65). The prosecutor brought out that Rick's wife, Brandi, is half 
Hispanic and that Rick's business partner is Hispanic (R. 230: 196-197). Additionally, all 
of the suspects at the showup were Hispanic (R. 246: 84-85). Under these circumstances, 
Rick's use of the ethnic slur is of "relatively little importance.M Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
c. Witness's Spontaneity and Consistency in Identifying Defendant. The 
fourth Ramirez factor takes into account the spontaneity and consistency of eyewitness 
identifications. 817 P.2d at 783. The three eyewitnesses individually described 
defendant immediately following the robbery at the Texaco station (R. 246: 110). They 
also unhesitatingly identified defendant in a showup a little over one-half hour after the 
robbery and their identification of him as one of the robbers remained consistent at a later 
photo spread, and ultimately, at trial (R. 246: 89-90, 100, 144-146). See Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 783 (noting that elapsed time of 30 minutes to an hour between crime and witness 
identification was minimal). Their initial descriptions of the robbers and their subsequent 
identifications of defendant in the photo spread were independently obtained (see, e.g., R. 
230: 227; R. 246: 44, 141). The only time the witnesses as a group identified defendant 
was on their initial arrival at the showup, when they excitedly blurted out that they 
recognized two of the suspects detained at the four-plex, even before the patrol car came 
to a halt, and before police could point out who the actual suspects were (see, e.g., R. 230: 
132-133,238; R. 246: 89-90). Under these facts, this spontaneous outburst supports, 
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rather than undermines, the reliability of the identifications. 
With regard to the consistency of the identifications, Rick, Brandi and Donny, 
consistently identified defendant as one of the robbers, varying only as to his level of 
participation in the aggravated robbery. They variously described defendant's 
participation as that of an alleged third robber without a gun (R. 246: 101), the robber that 
held a gun to Brandi (R. 246: 146-147), and the robber that a held a gun to Donny and 
then to Rick (R. 230: 105-107, 211; R. 246: 22). However, because the victims did not 
vary as to their identification of defendant as one of the robbers, and because the jury was 
instructed as to defendant's lability as a party to the aggravated robbery, this variance is 
relatively insignificant (see R. 156) (Jury Instruction #16) (a copy is contained in 
addendum G). "i 
Additionally, for the first time at trial, Brandi recalled that defendant had facial 
hair at the time of the robbery (R. 246: 29, 59). Rick also acknowledged that while he 
had not noticed defendant's slight facial hair during the robbery, defendant's facial hair 
was visible to him from a distance of five feet in the courtroom (R. 230: 167-168). 
Compare Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (upholding eyewitness identification even though 
witness failed to mention until trial that he had seen readily visible tattoos on Ramirez's 
arms), with Perry, 899 P.2d at 1234-35 (upholding eyewitness identification which mis- i 
described Perry as clean shaven when he in fact had a slight mustache). Trial counsel 
also brought out that Rick and Brandi had initially thought the robber that held a gun on 
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Rick was right-handed but that Rick had described the robber as left-handed at trial and 
that Brandi was uncertain (R. 230: 178; R. 246: 48). As noted earlier, these and any other 
minor inconsistencies do not render the victims' identification of defendant as one of the 
robber's inherently inadmissible; rather, it goes to weight of their testimony. Mincy, 838 
P.2d at 658. The jurors were instructed accordingly {see R. 145) (Jury Instruction # 6) (a 
copy is contained in addendum G). 
d. Suggestibility of Showup Less Egregious Than Ramirez Showup. The final 
and most critical Ramirez factor concerns the suggestibility of the showup itself. Like the 
showup in Ramirez, both Ramirez, and the group detained at the four-plex were 
illuminated by police flashlights and patrol car headlights and spotlights. Like Ramirez, 
defendant was likely identified in handcuffs, at night, in close proximity to police 
officers, and Brandi, at least, was told that police thought they had Mthe people" they were 
looking for (R. 230: 131, 138, 187; R. 246: 32). Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. However, 
unlike Ramirez, defendant had the benefit of being picked out from among several other 
Hispanic suspects (R. 230: 131; R. 246: 85-86). Because the circumstances surrounding 
the instant eyewitness identifications of defendant are less problematic than those in 
Ramirez, the admission of the testimony was proper in spite of the fact that the trial court 
was not given the opportunity to review the evidence. Accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
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3. Any Motion to Suppress the Eyewitness Identifications Would Have Been 
Futile 
"'"The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" Hovater, 914 P.2d at 44 (citations 
omitted). Based on the above, the three eyewitness identifications in this case were all 
more reliable than Wilson's unsuppressed identification in Ramirez. Indeed, the 
witnesses' observations of defendant were made in intrinsically better lighting conditions, 
and generally from within a few feet. While the witnesses were threatened at gunpoint, 
and Brandi had a gun held to her back, none of them were physically assaulted and 
injured as was the lone eyewitness in Ramirez. Moreover, the uniformity of the witnesses 
descriptions of defendant's race, approximate height, weight, and hairstyle lends weight
 { 
to the accuracy of the their individual observations. Finally, while the showup in both 
this case and in Ramirez were virtually identical, significantly, defendant was picked out 
from among several other Hispanic suspects. Accordingly, the eyewitness identifications 
in this case were superior to Wilson's unsuppressed identification in Ramirez. This Court 
should not therefore second-guess trial counsel's decision not to have wasted valuable 
preparation time in attempting to suppress identifications that would have been held 
constitutionally admissible. Hovater, 914P.2dat44. \ 
Defendant broadly maintains, without specifying which, that at least one of the 
identifications was suppressible under Ramirez. Aplt. Br. at 23. Even assuming one of 
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the identifications was suppressible under Ramirez, trial counsel acted reasonably in not 
moving to suppress any of the identifications. A motion to suppress the identifications 
would have risked succeeding only as to the weakest, leaving trial counsel with only the 
strongest identifications at trial. If only the strongest identifications were admitted, trial 
counsel would not have been able to substantially impeach the identifications in cross-
examination and effectively argue against the identifications in closing. See 
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 446 N.E.2d 383, 389 (Mass. 1983) (no ineffective 
assistance in declining to file motion to suppress, alleging suggestive photographic 
identification with "minimal chance of success," or based on tactical choice to instead 
cross-examine witnesses extensively and strenuously argue the weakness of the 
identification testimony); Commonwealth v. Levia, 431 N.E.2d 928, 933 (Mass. 1982) 
(tactical decision to forego attempted suppression of weaker of two identification 
witnesses and seek "spillover" effect from impeachment on cross-examination, and 
noting, in support of that strategy, that the defense counsel cross examined the weaker 
witness extensively and argued the weaknesses of his identification testimony in closing). 
In the circumstances of this case, it was therefore reasonable trial strategy to 
forego suppression entirely, a tactic which the Utah Supreme Court and others have found 
sufficient to rebut claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. VillarreaU 889 
P.2d 419,427 (Utah 1995) (upholding court of appeals' conclusion that trial counsel's not 
objecting to references to seemingly prejudicial evidence of defendant's probationary 
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record, dismissed criminal charges or victim's testimony, was "deliberate strategy falling 
will within the standard of reasonable professional performance"); State v. Bullock, 791 
P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (reasonable strategy in foregoing attempt to exclude 
conceivably inadmissible, videotaped child hearsay statements and focus instead on "less 
sympathetic" adult psychologist who could be shown to have employed "techniques akin 
to brainwashing"), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). Indeed, trial counsel extensively 
cross-examined Rick and Brandi on any limitations of their observations, inconsistencies 
in their identifications, the suggestiveness of the showup and any uncertainty in their in-
court identifications (R. 230: 152-170, i 6-191, ,98-200; R. 246: 43-53), which he 
developed to show asserted distinctions from defendant's actual appearance (R. 230: 166-
176; R. 246: 43, 47-48, 50; R. 247: 30), and highlighted in closing argument (R. 247: 28-
5 l).n In particular, trial counsel emphasized that all three witnesses had identified 
Gomez as defendant's alleged cohort, yet charges against Gomez were dismissed because < 
he had established an alibi (R. 247: 31,41, 46). He also emphasized jury instruction #18 
regarding the potential pitfalls in eyewitness identifications (R. 247: 47).12 Although trial 
counsel's strategy did not produce the desired result, "an unfavorable result is not 
1
 * Trial counsel was less successful in regards to Donny's testimony which was 
relatively free from inconsistency (R. 230: 223-238, 241). 
12Jury instruction #18 (R. 158-162) (a copy is contained in addendum G), 
constituted a combination of the parties requested instructions based on State v. Long, 721 < 
P.2dat488-91 (see R. 231:5-6). 
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sufficient for and does not give rise to a conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel." 
State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
B. Defendant Fails to Show that He was Prejudiced as a 
Result of Trial Counsel's Performance 
In claiming that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's performance below, 
defendant complains that this case "is in a different posture" than Ramirez was because it 
lacks a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on admissibility of the 
eyewitness identifications. Aplt. Br. at 23-24. He mistakenly and illogically argues that 
it would be inappropriate for this Court to make its own findings and conclusions in the 
absence of those of the trial court. Aplt. Br. at 24. 
As set out above, this case is not nearly as "close" as Ramirez, since there is no 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have suppressed the eyewitness 
testimony.13 This case is also not like Ramirez, where the supreme court held that the trial 
court had "abdicated its duty to rule and make findings "when the issue of suppression of 
illegal search and seizure was] raised." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787 (emphasis added).14 In 
"See State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in trial court's refusal to exclude equivocal eyewitness testimony of 
identifications made in less than opportune circumstances under pre-Zcwg standard), cert, 
denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); Perry, 899 P.2d at 1238 (finding eyewitness identification 
reliable even though victim, during a nighttime assault where threatened with a knife, 
viewed her assailant by street lights and possibly the dome light of her car for about 20 
seconds and later at a suggestive showup). 
XASee also State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997) (conviction 
vacated where, following motion to suppress and proffer of expert, trial court 
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this case, the trial court was never asked to consider a pre-trial Ramirez motion. 
However, at the conclusion of all the evidence, trial counsel did move to dismiss on 
grounds that the eyewitness identifications were so inconsistent as to render evidence of 
defendant's guilt insufficient to go to the jury (R. 246: 186), add. F. The trial court \ 
disagreed, ruling that any inconsistencies in the identifications went to the witness's 
credibility and that the State had presented sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury 
(id). The trial court was thus granted an opportunity to rule on the quality of the witness 
identifications and found nothing inherently unreliable therein (id.). The absence of 
i 
Ramirez findings and conclusions here therefore, does not present the same difficulty as 
in Ramirez. In any event, defendant explicitly begs this Court to rule without findings 
and conclusions, since he has argued that the record is adequate to review the ( 
admissibility of the identifications, even though the claim of ineffective assistance was 
not raised in the trial court. See Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing Hovater, 914 P.2d at 40). 
Furthermore, in addition to the corroborative and consistent identifications of 
defendant as one of the robbers, there was Donny's observation of the robbers' license 
< 
plate number (R. 230: 214-215; R. 246: 82). In fact, the robbers' Monte Carlo was 
discovered about one half block from the crime scene (R. 246: 80-82, 99), and defendant 
was discovered in attendance at the beer party being held at that same address (R. 246: 
"sidestepped its gatekeeping responsibility by failing to determine the constitutional 
admissibility of the eyewitness testimony"). 
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90). Defendant, moreover, left the party for approximately one half hour that evening for 
the purpose of obtaining more beer (R. 246: 71). Defendant's cousin Crystal was not sure 
whether defendant was present at the party between 12:30 p.m. and 1:00 a.m., the 
approximate time of the robbery (R. 246: 74).15 When the police arrived approximately 
one half hour after the robbery, only 7 or 8 people were present (R. 246: 98). 
Additionally, the robbers' Monte Carlo was registered to the wife of a friend of 
defendant's, Steve Trujillo, who resembles Gary Gomez, the robbery suspect identified 
by the witnesses, but against whom charges were dismissed when he established an alibi 
(R. 230: 202-204) (compare Exh. # 13 (Gomez' booking photo)), add. E, and (Exh. ## 14, 
37) (copies of Trujillo's booking photos are contained in addendum C). 
Finally, defendant admitted being present at the scene of the robbery, claiming he 
had purchased the Budweiser beer he brought back to the party at the same Circle-K 
where Rick Bergsma purchased the Budweiser beer that was stolen from him that night 
(R. 246: 136-137). No beer receipts were recovered from inside the Monte Carlo, or the 
apartment where the drinking party was held (R. 246: 99). In sum, even if one or two of 
the eyewitness identifications had been suppressed, it would not have resulted in a more 
favorable verdict, considering the additional compelling evidence. 
15Defendant's cousin Justin testified for the defense and claimed that defendant 
returned to the party at approximately 11:45 p.m., but acknowledged on cross-
examination that he had no special reason to accurately recall the time of defendant's 
return (R. 246: 167, 175). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reject as unsubstantiated, defendant's allegations of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, and affirm his conviction for aggravated robbery. 
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we'll have them order lunch when they come in at 10:30, 
and have it delivered at 11:30 or whatever, so they can 
start their deliberations on a good note, feeling that 
the state's done one little thing for them, if nothing 
else. Anything else that we need to discuss? Do you 
want to make your motion now, Mr. Garcia, on the record? 
MR. GARCIA: For the record, Your Honor, at 
the end of the state's case in chief I'd make a motion 
to dismiss. There is not sufficient evidence, given the 
contradictory nature of all of this testimony, to send 
the case to the jury. 
THE COURT: All right. I understand the 
motion. The motion is denied, this is a jury issue. 
Whether they find the witnesses credible, despite some 
inconsistencies, if they find they exist, is up to the 
jury. It's certainly enough to go to their at this 
juncture, in my opinion. 
So we will take a break, give my court 
reporter and counsel and the court at least fifteen 
minutes. So we'll come back at about quarter after and 
see whether you've got a rebuttal witness you want to 
call. 
(Brief recess.) 
THE COURT: Are we putting on a rebuttal 
witness? 
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Re: State v. Zqpez, Case No. 981085-CA 
Dear Ms. D'Alesandro: 
In preparing for the oral argument in this matter, scheduled to be held on 27 
August 1999, the State became aware of pertinent authority concerning the argument set 
out in the brief at pp. 20-23. Accordingly, the State cites as supplemental authority, State 
v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225,227-229 (Utah App. 1998). 
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